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To serve the people – total power in Zelensky’s hands 
Tadeusz Iwański
The key slogans of the campaign of Volodymyr Zelensky and his party Servant of the People 
ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections were: to bring fresh blood into the po-
litical class and to introduce honest professionals to politics who have not been discredited. 
The new president had no political experience whatsoever and, as a result of the parliamenta-
ry election, over three quarters of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) 
will be taken by individuals who have never served as members of parliament. The new parlia-
ment will have the lowest average age of its deputies since 1991 and the largest proportion of 
women (around 20%). The largest number of new and young politicians has been introduced 
to the Verkhovna Rada by the Servant of the People party and the Voice party. 
The sweeping victory attained by Zelensky’s party will allow it to form a government by itself. 
The president has announced that a new prime minister will be an economist “without polit-
ical experience”, and it can be assumed that this principle will also apply during the selection 
of most of the new ministers. Thus Ukraine, being at war with Russia and struggling with low 
economic growth, will be governed by individuals who are new to politics. This situation, be-
ing an effect of the high hopes and expectations of the Ukrainian public for a fundamental 
change of the system, is giving rise to the significant potential for positive changes but also 
might put the political stability and further development of the Ukrainian state at risk. 
The sources of success of the Servant 
of the People
The success of Zelensky and the Servant of the 
People is above all an effect of the promise to 
remove old politicians and thoroughly reor-
ganise the state through the engagement of 
non-discredited professionals. This coincided 
with the radical rejection by the voters of the 
team which governed Ukraine during the past 
five years and with the lack of improvement in 
the politico-economic situation. The political 
establishment has been disliked in Ukraine for 
many years, which was strongly emphasised 
during the Revolution of Dignity. However, five 
years ago, when the Ukrainian economy was 
plunged in a deep crisis, Crimea was annexed 
by Russia and the Donbass was the scene of in-
tensive military operations with the participa-
tion of regular Russian army troops, Ukrainians 
elected politicians who were widely associated 
with experience, stability and the ability to cope 
with external aggression. This led to victory for 
the pro-Western oligarch Petro Poroshenko in 
the presidential race and the parliamentary suc-
cess of the People’s Front, a party which had 
been hastily formed by economists, volunteers, 
military officers but also by numerous profes-
sional politicians who treated their parliamen-
tary seats as a guarantee of success in business. 
In 2019, the Ukrainian public grew accustomed 
to the war in Donbass, especially since it is 
low in intensity and the peace talks have been 
deadlocked. In turn, the economic situation has 
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stabilised to such an extent that Ukrainians 
are thinking not so much about survival but 
also about development. The growing aspira-
tions and the diminishing sense of threat have 
made the public more sensitive to corruption 
and many other pathologies in which the post-
Maidan government was involved. The Ukrain-
ian public started to believe that the only 
chance for improving their life and modernising 
the state will be to give power to people from 
outside the system who share the fears and 
hopes of most of the Ukrainian public, and not 
to corrupt politicians who have no idea about 
everyday reality, who have connections with 
oligarchs and failed to implement the prom-
ised reforms. Zelensky and the people linked to 
him understood this well and responded to this 
demand which led to electoral defeat for the 
previous government. While in 2014 the Peo-
ple’s Front garnered 22% of the votes, the Petro 
Poroshenko Bloc 21% and Self Reliance 11%, in 
July 2019, the People’s Front received 0% and 
was not even taken into account in the last 
polls. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc rebranded it-
self as “European Solidarity” and received 8.5% 
And Self Reliance received 0.6%. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to go along with the thesis 
that by ridding themselves of the old politi-
cians, in 2019 Ukrainians implemented another 
stage of the Revolution of Dignity or launched 
another revolution, this time an electoral one1. 
They preferred to take the risk of entrusting 
power to anyone trustworthy (according to 
a survey conducted in July, 60% of voters have 
1 This phrase was first used by the Ukrainian sociologist 
Yevhen Holovakha in an interview for the Ukrayinska 
Pravda portal on 18 April 2019, https://www.pravda.
com.ua/articles/2019/04/18/7212520/.
declared they trust Zelensky) who promised to 
bring new faces into politics, rather than once 
again cast their votes for representatives of the 
disgraced establishment. 
New is coming
The parliamentary election was unprecedent-
ed in several aspects. Never before did a vic-
torious party garner such a high level of public 
support (around 43%) and gain such a large 
representation in parliament (254 MPs). What 
decided about the scale of Zelensky’s victory 
was the surprisingly good result achieved in sin-
gle-member constituencies (130 seats), regard-
less of the fact that according to the estimates 
ahead of the election, representatives of Serv-
ant of the People were predicted to win around 
80 of them. None of the deputies from this 
party has ever been a member of parliament; 
this is an effect of the criterion adopted while 
preparing the election lists and selecting candi-
dates in single-member constituencies. At the 
same time, this condition, which was also ap-
plied in the party lists of the Voice, practically 
eliminated the chances of victory for most of 
the representatives of the inter-party faction 
of Euro-optimists consisting of 25 members 
who made efforts to push through reforms in 
the previous parliament. 
Zelensky’s popularity, being the main source 
of the success of his party, meant that many 
seasoned MPs lost the struggle for a seat in 
the new Verkhovna Rada. Another aspect of 
this victory is also the fact that some oligarchs’ 
influence in parliament has weakened. This in 
particular concerns Rinat Akhmetov. Howev-
er, it is still unclear how strong an impact an-
other oligarch, Ihor Kolomoyskyi who strongly 
backed Zelensky during the presidential race, 
will have on Ukraine’s political life. It is estimat-
ed that he may control dozens of deputies, but 
it is only future nominations in the government 
and state-controlled companies that will show 
the real scope of his influence. A conflict be-
tween Kolomoyskyi and Zelensky seems to be 
The fact that the party is strongly identi-
fied with the president means responsibil-
ity for the political processes in the coun-
try will predominantly be put on Zelensky. 
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just a matter of time, considering the oligarch’s 
ambitions. It is still an open question what the 
scale and the character of the conflict will be. 
Zelensky’s huge success during the presidential 
election and the subsequent sweeping victory 
of the Servant of the People in the parliamenta-
ry election prove that the party is strongly iden-
tified with the president. In practice this means 
that, as viewed by the public, Zelensky will be 
the main person responsible for the political 
processes in the country. However, the scope 
of his control over the party is currently unclear. 
Hopes, risks and question marks
The sweeping victory and the total power at-
tained by Zelensky gives rise to both hopes 
and risks. The main hope can be pinned on 
the effectiveness of the decision-making pro-
cess. If the president’s party has a parliamen-
tary majority and forms a government by itself, 
the traditional disputes within the triangle be-
tween the legislative and executive powers and 
the presidential administration will be less in-
tense. However, it also seems that the president 
intends to carry out real changes in Ukraine. 
Therefore, to fulfil the expectations pinned on 
him, shortly after the inauguration of the new 
parliament, he will put forward a number of 
pro-modernisation legislative initiatives which 
will be passed smoothly. The most likely initi-
atives include an anti-corruption campaign, 
a continuation of the deregulation of the econ-
omy and laws curbing the impunity enjoyed by 
politicians (including the removal of parliamen-
tary immunity and passing regulations on the 
president’s impeachment). At the same time, 
given the de facto monopoly of power, the 
checks and balances system will not work at 
full capacity, and it is presently unclear wheth-
er this potential will be utilised to conduct the 
reforms expected by the Ukrainian public or to 
appropriate the state. 
The parliamentary groupings that are in op-
position to the Servant of the People govern-
ment are divided and have different political 
manifestos. Although it is possible to imagine 
them agreeing on stances on some issues (in-
cluding with the government), a comprehen-
sive and coordinated co-operation is ruled out. 
Even though most of the opposition parties 
have significant financial and media resources 
at their disposal (such as the European Solidar-
ity, the Opposition Platform – For Life and Bat-
kivshchyna), they will not be able to outweigh 
the potential of the Servant of the People which 
has state instruments at its disposal. A situa-
tion like this may tempt the most senior state 
authorities to abuse power and instrumentalise 
the law, which may even lead to a regression of 
democracy. 
However, the biggest question is how the Serv-
ant of the People grouping will function in 
parliament. The party was established shortly 
ahead of the election and presented people 
from various circles as its candidates, with dif-
ferent experience and competences. It is only 
after the final outcome of the election has been 
announced that the party leaders and the pres-
ident will finally find out what potential they 
have at disposal. However, it is a fact that the 
new deputies do not form a coherent group 
sharing similar values or even interests. Given 
this diversity and also the large number of mem-
bers, separate factions and interest groups are 
inevitably bound to be formed inside it. While it 
seems that some of these groups will be organ-
ised guided by personal loyalties (for example, 
a group linked to Kolomoyskyi, a group linked 
to the Kvartal 95 company, a group of profes-
sionals), there will be still a large group of depu-
ties whose connections and motivations are un-
clear. They may become engaged in pro-reform 
The total power held by Zelensky, given 
the weakness of the state institutions and 
the fragmentation of the opposition, may 
prove to be a temptation to those in power 
and lead to a regression of democracy.
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initiatives in the broad meaning of the term, 
but it should be assumed that some of them 
will be tempted by corrupt offers. Thus, it is 
a great challenge for Zelensky to become ca-
pable of leading the faction and reducing con-
flicts of interest that may arise in the future. 
Ukraine is heading to the unknown
It seems that, regardless of the extensive pre-
rogatives both the new government and the 
parliament will have, the presidential admin-
istration will remain the centre of power. This 
will be an effect of the fact that deputies repre-
senting the Servant of the People to a great ex-
tent owe their parliamentary seats to Zelensky 
and the fact that this centre formed first and 
is currently making the most important staff-
ing decisions. At the same time, since the pres-
ident has no political experience, his advisors 
and aides introducing him to the government 
system will play a serious role. This system is 
particularly complex in Ukraine, given the mul-
titude of informal business-political and family 
connections which are often more important 
than official party membership.
Inside Zelensky’s inner circle, the head of the 
Presidential Administration, Andriy Bohdan, 
will play the role of a ‘guide’. Mr Bohdan acted 
as an attorney of the oligarch Ihor Kolomoys-
kyi and served as a deputy minister of Justice 
(2007–2010). He is a good lawyer who both 
knows well the rules of the state administra-
tion’s operation and has extensive contacts 
inside Ukraine’s political and business elite. 
Zelensky also reportedly trusts Bohdan be-
cause it was his idea to put forward the ac-
tor as a candidate in the presidential election. 
However, despite his young age (43) and con-
sidering his professional and political expe-
rience, he fits in well with the old order and 
will be more inclined to bend the law and use 
legal loopholes rather than improve the law as 
part of the system. Such a character of rela-
tions between the two politicians may enhance 
Bohdan’s ambitions and thus his influence on 
current politics. 
The election in 2019 redefined the main axis of 
the political divide in Ukraine. While in 2014 it 
was organised by the dichotomy: pro-Western 
vs. pro-Russian, since then this dispute has more 
and more clearly been arranged along the line 
that divides the politicians into ‘old’ and ‘new’. 
At the same time, the term ‘old’ does not refer 
to age but rather to formal participation in the 
pathologies of Ukraine’s political life. Likewise 
the term ‘new’ is a synonym of high moral and 
professional standards and the absence of links 
with oligarchs and the corruption-stained past. 
The government constellation that has formed 
as a result of the presidential and parliamenta-
ry elections is formed predominantly by inex-
perienced individuals whose views concerning 
the key lines of the development of the state 
are unclear, and who will only begin to learn 
how to function in politics. Furthermore, they 
have gained total power, and the mechanisms 
of its control are weak. The composition of 
the new government, which will most likely be 
formed predominantly by professionals, gives 
some hope. Nevertheless, the election this year 
is bringing Ukraine to a new stage which will 
decide whether youth and a lack of experience 
are a good recipe for the modernisation of the 
state which is so much desired by the Ukrainian 
public.
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APPENDIX
Voice 5.8%
European Solidarity 8.11%
Opposition Platform
– For Life 13%
Batkivshchyna 8.18%
Servant of the People 43.1%
Chart 1. Support levels for political parties which crossed the 5% election threshold
Chart 2. Number of seats won
Source: Ukrainian Central Election Committee
Source: Ukrainian Central Election Committee
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